

October 17, 1967

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

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**TOO HEROIC TO DIE**

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. PEPPER], is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, most of the free world held its breath through the tense days of May and early June, when Israel, alone and without an ally stood resolutely against the vaunted might of the Arab nations poised on her borders, who were ready to annihilate the tiny enclave of democracy in the Middle East. Yes, without an ally; for Israel has no treaties, no alliances, no guarantees with any other nation to insure support in time of need. As events have since proven, Israel was well up to the task of meeting the Arab attack unassisted. The magnificent Israel defense forces defeated the combined armies of her Arab antagonists in a brief but telling war that ably demonstrated that this nation was not about to surrender her freedom because of the threats of a few hate-filled tyrants.

The distinguished novelist James A. Michener characterized Israel in an article in the August 8, 1967, issue of *Look* magazine as "A Nation Too Young To Die." In asking that this fine article be inserted in the *Record*, I would suggest also that Israel and her people have demonstrated themselves to be "too heroic to die" and determined to live and make the Holy Land flower once again:

## ISRAEL: A NATION TOO YOUNG TO DIE

(By James A. Michener)

I remember when I first became aware of the unnatural tension under which the citizens of Israel have been obliged to live since the establishment of their nation in 1948. I had come to the seaport city of Haifa to do research on a book, and for well over a year, I stayed there, probing the various libraries at my disposal.

Almost every week, and often three or four times a week, my morning paper carried the news that one or another leading Arab politician, and not infrequently a head of state of one of the neighboring Arab countries, had announced his intention of leading an army that would "push the Jews of Israel into the sea," or that would "wipe them off the face of the earth," or perhaps, "strangle them forever." I suppose that the threats occurring during the time I worked in Israel totaled well over a hundred.

They came from more than a half-dozen different countries, some as far away as Algeria and Morocco, whose preoccupation with Israel I could not understand. They did not come, so far as I remember, from Lebanon or Jordan, which have common boundaries with Israel.

Especially appalling to me were the five different times when some Arab head of state announced that he was going to blow up the city in which I sat working. I took even those threats without panic, for I have seen a good deal of war and bombing and do not frighten easily, but I must admit that when the Arab leaders narrowed down their target to the hotel in which I was sitting, and when on two occasions they gave a specific timetable for dispatching their rockets, I felt shivers run up my spine.

I lived for more than a year under these constant threats. I neutralized them by saying, "I'm free to leave Israel when I like. I have no personal attachments and no re-

sponsibility." But what must have been the accumulated anxiety for the head of a growing family in Haifa who heard these threats each week, not for one year but for nineteen? What must have been his feelings if he knew that he could not leave the threatened country, that he had a responsibility both to his family and to his nation?

Israel's apprehension was not a paper one. In addition to the threats, there were constant incursions into Israel, constant shootings across the borders, constant intrusions by groups as large as squadrons or small companies. If I went to do some research on the old synagogue at Korazim, I was somewhat taken aback to find that one day later, a pitched battle had been fought there and two Israeli civilians had been killed. If I went on a picnic to the Sea of Galilee, I was a bit shaken when two days later, there was a bombardment of Israeli boats. If I visited the kibbutz at Dan and waded upstream to the cool spring that forms one of the headwaters of the River Jordan, I was frightened to learn that, shortly before, a man had been lost doing that. And when I moved to Jerusalem, to work in the libraries there, I was sorrowful when children told me I must not walk down this alley by the Persian synagogue; gunfire had been coming in from the rooftops only 50 feet away.

And wherever I went, whether to Haifa, or to Korazim, or the Galilee, or Beersheba, there was the constant dinning in my ears of the threat, reiterated week after week, "We are going to destroy you. We are going to push you into the sea." The history of Israel is the history of ordinary people living ordinary lives under the incessant repetition of that threat, backed up by just enough Arab military activity to prove that the threat might be put into action at any moment.

To understand the problem of Israel, the outsider must imagine himself living in Washington, D.C., and reading each morning that neighbors in Baltimore and Alexandria have again threatened to blow Washington off the face of the earth and to push all Washingtonians into the Potomac. The threat, mind you, does not come from across the Atlantic or Pacific. It comes from a few miles away. And to prove the reality of the threat, actual military adventures occur from time to time, taking the lives of random Washingtonians.

What chance would you say there was for the citizens of Washington to go on indefinitely ignoring such behavior? This article is an account of why the citizens of Israel had to react to such a situation.

I must point out at the beginning that I hold no special brief for either the Israelis or Jews in general. I have lived too long among them to retain any starry-eyed visions. They are ordinary people marred by ordinary weaknesses and bolstered by the courage that ordinary men of all nations and races can at times draw upon. I worked among Muslims for ten years before I ever set foot in Israel, and on at least 50 percent of the characteristics by which men and societies are judged, I like Muslims at least as well as I like the Jews.

Furthermore, I am a professional writer who has worked in many contrasting societies, and I have found none inherently superior to all others. There have been many single aspects of Japan, or Polynesia, or Spain, or India, or Afghanistan that I have preferred, and to me, Israel is merely one more country. It happens to have certain characteristics that elicit enormous respect, but so did each of the Muslim countries in which I worked.

What we are concerned with here is a problem of worldwide significance: How can nations that must live side by side do so with a decent regard one for the other? In trying to reach a solution to this problem, Israel has as many responsibilities as its

neighbors. However, this particular inquiry relates primarily to certain adjustments the Arabs must make before any kind of stability can be achieved in a region where stability is much to be desired.

Exactly how vicious were the verbal threats? It will be instructive, I think, to follow the behavior of one Arab country over a short period of time so that the non-Middle Easterner can catch something of the quality of the attacks that were constantly being made. For his purpose, I have chosen Syria, which has a common frontier with Israel and an internal political problem that makes verbal attacks on Israel an attractive form of demagoguery.

For some years, Syria's politics have been unusually volatile. During my stay in the area, there were several revolutions, three complete changes of government and continued violence. At one time, observers had hoped that Syria's political union with Egypt might produce a substantial and stable bloc of Arab power that would carry with it a sense of responsibility. But that union did not last long, and with its dissolution, Syria plunged into contortions that carried it first in one direction, then another. Consequently, Syrian politicians found that the one thing that united them was a common call for violence against Israel. This is how they spoke:

March 13 1966, the official newspaper, *Al Baath*: "It has become evident that our problem will only be solved by an armed struggle to expel the rapacious enemy, and put an end to the Zionist presence."

April 17 1966, the chief of state of the country, Nureddin Al-Attassi, in a speech at a military parade: "A total popular war of liberation is the only way to liberate Palestine and foil the plan of imperialism and reaction. . . . We shall work for the mobilization of all efforts for the needs of the total popular war of liberation."

May 12 1966, the Syrian commander in chief: "As for the statements of the so-called ministers and officials in Israel that they will punish states which support the commando forces . . . we tell them that we shall wage a liberation war against them as the Party has decided, and fear and alarm will fill every house in Israel."

May 19, 1966, Radio Damascus: "When our revolution declared that the way to liberate Palestine is through a popular war, it knew beforehand that the meaning of this declaration is an open and decisive confrontation with Israel."

May 22, 1966, Chief of State Al-Attassi: "We raise the slogan of the people's liberation war. We want total war with no limits, a war that will destroy the Zionist base."

May 24, 1966, Syrian Defense Minister Hafez Assad: "We say: We shall never call for, nor accept peace. . . . We have resolved to drench this land with our blood, to oust you, aggressors, and throw you into the sea for good."

July 16, 1966, Premier Yousef Zouayen: "The popular liberation war which the Palestinian masses, backed by the Arab masses in the whole Arab homeland, have determined to wage, will foil the methods of Israel and those behind it. We say to Israel: 'Our reply will be harsh and it will pay dearly.'"

It must be remembered that the above quotations come from a period of relative stability along the Syrian-Israeli frontier. In the succeeding nine months, from September, 1966, through May, 1967, or just before the outbreak of armed hostilities, both the tempo and the inflammability increased. In those weeks when Syria was not threatening to destroy Israel, the heads of other Arab nations were. During my stay in Israel, I believe all the Arab states, excepting Jordan and Lebanon, made specific announcements that they were preparing a war that would drive Israel into the sea.

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This constant incendiary barrage came to a climax in May of 1967, when war against Israel had pretty well been agreed upon, and perhaps that accounts for the exaggerated quality of these statements:

25 May 1967, Cairo radio, in a broadcast to all Arab countries: "The Arab people is firmly resolved to wipe Israel off the map."

26 May 1967, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt: "Our basic aim will be to destroy Israel."

26 May 1967, the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Ahmed Shukairy: "D-day is approaching. The Arabas have waited 19 years for this and will not flinch from the war of liberation."

29 May 1967, the same Mr. Shukairy: "The struggle has begun at the Gulf of Aqaba and will end at the Bay of Acre."

30 May 1967, Cairo radio: "Faced by the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel has two choices, both of which are drenched with Israel's blood: Either it will be strangled by the Arab military and economic siege or it will be killed by the bullets of the Arab armies surrounding it from the South, from the North and from the East."

1 June 1967, the commander of the Egyptian Air Force on Egyptian television: "The Egyptian forces spread from Rafah to Sharm el Sheikh are ready for the order to begin the struggle to which we have looked forward for so long."

Now, I suppose that a logical man ought to reason: "If the leaders of the Arab states confine their threats to verbalisms, no matter how virulent, the citizens of Israel should adjust to the situation, for obviously the Arabs are using words in a way that need not be taken seriously." Speaking for myself after my initial weeks of shock, I began to dismiss the blasts against Israel as bombast.

I tried to quiet my inner fears and become adjusted to this incessant barrage of verbal treats, but my ability to live with them did not mean that I was immune to them. Not at all. For whether I liked it or not, I was living under an act of aggression. That is was psychological rather than physical made it the more insidious. I began to find that, although in public I dismissed the threats as evidences of temporary insanity on the part of those who made them, when I was alone, I had to worry about them. Against my will, I found myself concluding, "If Syria and Egypt and Iraq and the others keep on making such threats, they must in the end do something about them. And if Israelis continue to hear these threats week after week, they must in the end accept them as real, and they, too, will have to act upon them."

In this way, not only were the airwaves polluted, not only was all intercourse between nations contaminated and all chance of peaceful coexistence frustrated, but the psychological processes of both those who made the threats and those who received them were slowly and painfully corroded until both Arab and Jew knew that war was inevitable. On one visit to Jordan, which was one of the least psychotic areas, I talked with 16 young Arabs, and all said they longed for the day when they could march with the Arab armies into Israel and wipe it off the face of the earth. In Egypt, I found attitudes the same. And what was most regrettable, in Israel, where I knew thousands of persons who would speak frankly, a dull kind of resignation possessed them: "I suppose that one of these days we shall have to defend ourselves again."

It is because of the danger that thrives on verbal threats that English common law evolved the concept of assault and battery. Not many laymen appreciate that in law, the threat to do bodily damage is roughly the same as physically doing it. But society has learned that the continued psychological damage to the threatened victim is often graver than an actual punch in the nose might have been. The threat involves uncer-

tainty and accumulating fear, whereas the physical release of an actual blow is over and done with in an instant. Thus, in strict legality, if I hold a gun and threaten, "I am going to shoot you," that is an assault. If I actually do the shooting, it is a battery. The important thing, however, is that the law holds the two things roughly equal, and a private citizen may be as quickly thrown in jail for one as for the other.

When assault is resorted to by nations, it is a violation of the United Nations Charter, Article 2, Principle number 4. Yet for 19 years, Israel lived under constant assaults.

In spite of my knowledge that a verbal assault is sometimes more destructive than a physical battery, in spite of my recognition of Arab behavior as aggression, and in spite of my experience with history that proves one aggression breeds another, I still clung to my hope that as long as the Syrians and the Egyptians confined themselves to wordy abuse, Israel could learn to live with it as one of the peculiarities of Arab politics. I even began to understand why nations as far away as Morocco, Algeria and Pakistan wanted to participate in the verbal campaign, for in this way, they kept their franchise as Muslim states. I was pleased to see that more mature Muslim sovereignties like Turkey, Iran and even Arab Tunisia wanted no part of this folly. Again and again, I told my Israeli friends and others who asked me, "As long as the Arabs confine themselves to verbal threats alone, no great damage will be done."

Unfortunately, the surrounding countries did not confine themselves to verbalisms. They also engaged in open acts of invasion, sabotage, terrorism and military action. I myself witnessed the aftermaths of three such actions.

One day in 1963, I visited the ancient black-basalt synagogue at Korazim because I wanted to see how Jews had worshiped in the time of Christ. It is believed that Jesus once lectured there, and I found ruins not often visited by tourists. It was a remote area, peaceful, indifferent, as old almost as the hills. But on the next day, Syrian armed units invaded this rural scene and killed two civilians. Hotheads in Syria boasted that this was part of a planned program of harassment that would continue until all Jews were driven into the sea.

Again in 1963, I visited the Kibbutz Ein Gev for one of its famous fish dinners and a lazy afternoon of watching boats drifting across the Sea of Galilee. I also climbed up into the hills in back of Ein Gev to see the incredible kibbutz perched on the last half inch of Israeli soil. As I sat in the dining room, whose windows were shielded by a massive concrete bunker, a young Israeli girl explained, "We have to have the wall to keep out the Syrian bullets, for they shoot at us whenever we sit down to eat." Two days after my visit, a Syrian gun emplacement in the hills lobbed shells into the lake, sank a fishing boat and injured five fishermen. Once more, Syria publicly announced that this was part of a continuing campaign.

My most moving experience came when I visited the beautiful Catholic monastery marking the supposed site of Christ's Sermon on the Mount. It rests on the hills west of Capernaum, where Jesus sometimes argued with scholars, and while I was staying there, I learned that shortly before, in Israeli fields to the east, a Syrian patrol had planted land mines and one had exploded, killing Israeli farmers.

I could go on through the years 1964, 1965, 1966 and 1967, citing incident after incident in which acts of actual warfare were perpetrated in this region. From the high hills that Syria occupied to the east, gun positions pumped in random shots at workers on the Israeli farms. From protected emplacements along the shore of the Sea of Galilee, Syrian guns fired point-blank at Israeli fishermen. And night after night, marauding

parties crept over the border to mine, to murder and destroy.

Now, no man in right mind would claim that Israel in the meantime was sitting idly by in childish innocence, or that it accepted these invasions of its sovereignty without striking back. In self-respect, there had to be retaliations, and there were. These warlike Arab acts, backing up verbal threats, would have been suicidal for the Israeli Government to ignore. Arab leaders now began massing enormous armies with much first-rate equipment, and these gave every evidence of being able to crush Israel. What was most provocative of all, the leaders of this might openly announced that they planned to launch a full-scale war. If ever a nation was forewarned by word and act and specific promise of annihilation, it was Israel.

What were the odds against Israel? A quick glance at the figures—46 million in the surrounding Arab countries, 97 million in all, as against 2.6 million Israelis—might lead one to believe that the Arab states would have little trouble in overwhelming Israel, except that twice before, in 1948 and 1956, they had tried to do so and failed. Arab leaders grew adept in explaining away the somber fact that twice, a handful of Jews had resisted efforts to throw them into the sea. "In 1948," explained the leaders, "we were betrayed by Great Britain, and in 1956, it was the French and English armies that defeated us through their invasion of the Suez." By June, 1967, a persuasive legend had grown up, largely masking the truth that the Arab states had ever tested arms with the Israelis, and completely ignoring that in each war, the Israelis had been victorious. In a magic flood of words, history was repealed.

The Arab leaders created an enticing world of fantasy; one demagogue lived on the pronouncements of the other, and in time, all came to believe that facts were other than they had been. When the Arab armies were able to import huge supplies of modern weapons from their East European supporters, they really believed that their peasant levies, with little stake in their society to fight for, would stand up against Israelis who had good homes, better universities and a deep moral commitment to their nation.

I have had two opportunities to witness the impact of this fantasy world upon rational Arabs. In one of my books, I described in some detail the manner in which, in 1948, Jewish youths captured the north Israeli city of Safad against overwhelming numbers of Arab soldiers. At no point in my description did I deride the Arabs or cast aspersions upon them. Some dozen correspondents in the different Arab nations commented upon this favorably when they wrote to me complaining about the passage. What they objected to were the facts I presented. Some claimed that the Jews must have numbered 20 or 30 times their known strength. Others argued that Arab units that we know to have been in the city were not really there. Several explained that the loss was due to British perfidy in turning over to the Jews the best military sites, whereas the truth was just the opposite. And all expressed the opinion that I had been tricked by a legend that had not really happened. I had the strange feeling that my correspondents trusted that one morning, they would waken to find that Safad had never really been lost at all, that it was still in Arab hands and that maps and stories to the contrary had been mere propaganda.

Of course, in the preceding paragraph, I am generalizing from a dozen letters, none of whose authors did I see personally, and it may be that I am reading into their letters a greater evidence of fantasy than the writers showed. About my second experience, I cannot make such an error, for it I witnessed in person.

In the summer of 1964, I was vacationing in the lovely city of Alexandria, made fa-

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mous by the writers of antiquity and by Charles Kingsley and Lawrence Durrell, and one day at sunset, as I was strolling along that unequalled boulevard that runs beside the Mediterranean, I came to a park where in the evenings, a concert of folk music was offered. Now, I am very partial to this form of entertainment, for one learns much from uncontaminated folk songs. So I bought a ticket for the performance.

At the concert, I found a large number of Egyptian families with their children. It was a splendid night, filled with stars and coolness, and we sat back to watch a first-class performance of folk song and dance. The choruses were strong, the dancers agile, and the evening compared with others I had enjoyed in Kyoto, Djakarta, Manila and Mexico City.

A rather larger cast performed, and this made me wonder where the money to pay them came from, for the audience was not unusually big, and the prices we had paid were only nominal. I shrugged my shoulders and concluded that this was someone else's problem, but when the regular performance had ended, with a false note that I could detect, the bugles started blowing, excitement gripped the children in the audience, and the curtains parted to show a scene in the year A.D. 2000. In a park much like the one in which we were sitting, a group of children played about the statue of an Egyptian soldier while an old man watched. One of the children asked who the statue was, and by names of a dance, the old fellow explained. Years dropped from his shoulders. His cane became a gun. His ragged clothes fell away to reveal a military uniform, and as more bugles blew, ghost of his former companions in arms appeared onstage, and in wonderfully choreographed pantomime, the Egyptian Army demonstrated how it had won the great war of 1956.

The scene was at Suez, where a handful of heroic Egyptians held off and finally defeated not an Israeli army but invaders storming ashore from French and English battleships. For each Egyptian soldier, scores of Frenchmen and Englishmen rushed onstage, only to be overwhelmed by sheer courage. In the end, the invaders had to retreat, whereupon the Egyptian defenders fell into a tableau of victory as fine as any I had ever seen. The great powers had been driven off, and Egyptian honor was once more secure.

I looked about me at the audience, and it was apparent that the adults, many of whom must have participated in the events thus portrayed, had begun to accept this version as history. Their eyes glowed, and a real patriotism suffused their faces. As we left the park, I saw one young boy of nine or ten lunging out with an imaginary bayonet to hold off imaginary Frenchmen and Englishmen. When I made inquiries about the performance, I found that it was paid for by the government and was repeated throughout the year.

The whole thing was fantasy, of course, and certainly no worse than similar versions of English history offered in London or French history in Paris. I am sure that parallel perversions could be found in American folklore, and I doubt that much harm is done to children by this patriotic nonsense. But in the case of Egypt and the other Arab lands, there was an additional danger because adults, too, were accepting such fables: college professors, university students, newspaper editors, businessmen believed that Egypt had won a great victory in 1956. I could find no evidence that anyone in public life was willing to admit that in Egypt's military adventure against a handful of Jews, the latter had easily won.

All nations engage in fantasy, but few indulge themselves with so virulent a dream as the twofold Arab dream that Israel does not exist and that the Jews who presently occupy the land of Israel can easily be

pushed into the Mediterranean . . . whenever the Arabs finally decide to do so.

Sometime in the spring of 1967, the Arab leaders decided that the time was ripe. Under incessant pressure from Ahmed Shukairy, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, who stood to win himself the satrapy of Palestine if he could goad Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia into declaring war on Israel, and with the full connivance of Gamal Abdel Nasser, who stood to win himself an emperorship if the war was successful, the Arab nations reached an understanding. These men who had lived so long on fantasy now conceived the supreme fantasy that they could quickly destroy the nation that had twice defeated them and had in the interim grown stronger socially, psychologically and morally, even though its airplanes and tanks had not kept pace in numbers with those of the Arabs.

On May 16, 1967, President Nasser initiated the two final moves. On that day, he elbowed the United Nations Emergency Force out of its peacekeeping positions along the Egyptian-Israeli border in the Sinai Peninsula and forced it ignominiously to retire from the area, thus depriving Israel of the one slim assurance it had that a surprise attack would not be launched from the desert. The fire engine that was supposed to protect the community scuttled out of town at the first smell of smoke. In its place, President Nasser moved up his own divisions, and the stage was set for war.

On May 22, 1967, he made his second crucial move. With the retreat of the United Nations troops, he found himself in sole control of Sharm el Sheik, the fortress commanding the strait leading into the Gulf of Aqaba. It was a simple matter for him to announce that henceforth, the Gulf would be closed to Israeli ships and even to ships of other nations carrying strategic materials bound for Israel. None would be permitted to enter and none to leave. This was a hostile act and had to be construed as a declaration of war. That President Nasser was aware of the gravity of his act, he took no pains to hide: "Sharm el Sheik and the blockade mean real confrontation with Israel. Taking such a step means that we should be ready to enter full-scale war with Israel. It is not an isolated operation."

The Gulf has been recognized as an international waterway because four sovereign nations line its coasts: on the east, Saudi Arabia; on the west, Egypt; on the north, Israel; and on the northeast, Jordan. But it is more important economically to Israel than to any of the other three, since Elath is a major port for handling oil and other heavy cargoes. If the Gulf of Aqaba were to be closed to all shipping, whether to Jordan or Israel, the blockade would damage Jordan, but it would prostrate Israel. However, ships intended for Jordan were allowed to pass and during the exercise of the blockade, several did proceed unmolested to Jordan. This underlined the fact that the blockade was meant to be an act of war, and lest any misunderstand the intention, President Nasser proclaimed on May 26:

"The Arab people want to fight. . . .

"We have been waiting for the suitable day when we shall be completely ready, since if we enter a battle with Israel we should be confident of victory and should take strong measures. We do not speak idly.

"We have lately felt that our strength is sufficient, and that if we enter the battle with Israel we shall, with God's help, be victorious. Therefore, we have now decided that I take real steps.

"The battle will be a full-scale one, and our basic aim will be to destroy Israel."

Obviously, the major maritime nations of the world, having anticipated that such a blockade might one day be attempted, in which case their ships would be powerless to enter the narrow strait, had long been on

record regarding two points: (1) the Gulf of Aqaba was an international waterway, and (2) as such, it must be kept open for all nations to use equally without let or hindrance.

By flouting international law and blockading the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, President Nasser had effectively and somewhat cleverly cut Israel's lifeline to the south. If the blockade were allowed to continue unchallenged, Israel would experience what its Arab neighbors had been threatening for so long—its strangulation. This was war but still only an indirect version, in the economic field. One could reasonably hope that from it, President Nasser might back away, but such hopes were dashed on May 28, when he announced over the radio: "We intend to open a general assault against Israel. This will be total war. Our basic aim is the destruction of Israel."

As the Arabs prepared for what they assured themselves was to be the final conquest of Israel, their morale was at high pitch. And because of what they had been told so continuously over the previous eight years regarding their victory over the British and French in 1956, they believed in all honesty that this time they were going to crush Israel, and fairly easily.

President Nasser encouraged this belief by his belligerent speeches. From Syria, Chief of State Al-Attassi thundered that his army was impatient to begin marching.

The foot soldiers, the aviators, the tank commanders and even the generals prepared to launch what they were convinced would be an easy, victorious sortie. In the fantasy world in which they had lived for so long, and to which they had contributed, words took the place of accomplishment, wishes took the place of military discipline, and inflated dreams of revenge superseded facts.

If the Arabs with their verbal assaults had made life difficult for Israel, they had perpetrated a worse crime against themselves; for they had come to believe their own inflated nonsense.

At the hour of attack, the Voice of the Arabs radio station in Cairo issued this stirring call to its soldiers. It is the usual heartening battle cry that all nations use at a time of crisis and in general purpose is not much different from what Englishmen or Russians or Americans would shout to their soldiers; but in the cry for avenging 1948, one hears a unique and ominous overtone:

"Destroy, ruin, liberate. Woe to Israel, your hour has arrived. The Arab nation is on its way to render its account. O Israel, this is your end.

"Every Arab must take revenge for 1948, must cross the Armistice lines from all directions and head for Tel Aviv. We shall drive out of existence the shame of Zionism. Rescue the looted Palestine. Hit everywhere till the end.

"There is no room for Israel in Palestine. This is your responsibility, O Arab soldiers! Israel, faste death!"

It required less than 72 hours in June to deflate this bombast.

What can be done to awaken the Arab masses to the reality that Israel stands where it does and will presumably remain there for some centuries? In the aftermath of 1948, the rest of the world permitted and perhaps encouraged the Arabs to follow a policy of blandly refusing to admit that Israel existed. The armistice commissions, which should have worked out regional policies, were not permitted to operate effectively. Decisions upon which peace depended could not be made because the Arabs refused to acknowledge that history had produced an old-new nation that would prove most viable—that was too young to die. The normal intercourse between nations, such as is conducted between Russia and Germany, which were certainly as bitter enemies as Egypt and Israel, was forbidden, and the region fumbled its way to the war of 1956.

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When Israel won handily, the refusal to admit realities persisted, and the same errors were allowed to continue. International commissions did not function, and normal intercourse between nations did not mature, even though the Arab portion of the region and the Israeli form a marvelous, interlocking whole—a unit whose various segments could well profit from economic, medical, educational, developmental and planning cooperation. The blindness and the arrogant folly that produced this stalemate also produced the speeches cited in this article. And they in turn produced the hysteria that led to a third war in less than 20 years.

If the world, in 1948, had insisted that the nations of this area sit down in honest consultation, 1956 might have been avoided. If the world, following the disaster of 1956, had insisted that the Arab nations at least awaken to the existence of Israel, the tremendous folly of 1967 could have been avoided. Now, the world has a third chance, and if some right decisions are made in the months ahead, the even greater tragedy of 1977 may be avoided. What is necessary is a reasonable revision of boundary lines; a sensible settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem; a cessation of verbal assault and physical battery; and a union of talents and interests, of resources and abilities, so that the region can move forward to a creative society in which all members live infinitely better than anyone there now does.

Am I hopeful that the world will now sensibly tackle its problems when it refused to do so in the aftermath of 1948 and 1956? I am not. President Gamal Abdel Nasser pulled out of the hat one of the cleverest tricks of his career when, in the first hours of defeat, he invented the enticing theory that once again it was not Israelis who were crushing his armed might from every direction but English and American aviators. His explanation captivated the imagination of all Arabs, and within a few days was adopted as official dogma. In 1970, when I revisit the lovely waterfront of Alexandria, I expect to see a tableau explaining how, in a moment of travail in the spring of 1967, the Egyptians and their Arab allies stood bravely against the combined might of Great Britain and the United States and repulsed it. That Israel was involved will not be mentioned.

At the moment when Egyptian armies were suffering their worst defeats, Egypt's undefeated radio was broadcasting the following careful analysis of the situation:

"The United States is the enemy. Its fighters and bombers gathered in large groups to provide for Israel an air umbrella that prevents the Arabs from bombing Israel's towns and villages, while it is moving fast all along the occupied frontiers of the Arabs. The United States, therefore, is the aggressor.

"The United States saw Israel about to collapse under the blow of death. The Chicago gangs moved; the state of gangsterism and bloodshed moved; it moved in order to protect its aggressive base in the Middle East. How vile and treacherous the United States has been in its collusion with the Zionists! It refrained from coming out openly to fight us. It refrained from facing the Arabs with an open and daring hostility. No, Arabs. The United States is too vile and too base to have the ethics of cavalier. The United States threw, from all its airports and aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean, huge and continuous massings of its fighters and bombers in order to provide that air umbrella that protected Israel from the revenge of the Arabs, from the massings of the Arabs, and from the victory of the Arabs.

"The battle is continuing, United States. ... It is going on until you become, as Britain became after the 1956 collusion, third-rate state. Here we shall bury the American international gangsterism. Here, Arabs, dig graves everywhere; dig them for every U.S.

existence; dig them, Arabs. Dig all the homeland a grave for U.S. existence. Dig it, Arabs. Dig it, Arabs. Dig it, Arabs.

"The curse of all the Arabs from the ocean to the gulf and from every corner of the globe, is on you, America, and on your lackey, Israel; together with the curse of all free peoples, the curse of free men everywhere."

On the night when the defeat of the Arab armies was known to the world as one of the most crushing in history, I discussed matters on an all-night radio show with Dr. M. T. Mehdi, secretary-general of the Action Committee on American-Arab Relations, and he made these points: "Nothing has changed. Israel is worse than Nazi Germany, and the Arabs will have to drive her from the region. The war will continue precisely as it has been going for the past 19 years. And what the Americans and the English took away from the Arabs by their intervention, the Arabs will recover at the conference table. Peace talks, of course, will have to be conducted through third parties at the United Nations, because no Arab leader will ever agree to sit down and talk with an outlaw nation like Israel. You'll see. The United Nations will force Israel back to her 1948 boundaries, after which all Arab nations will unite in a war to exterminate her, because this is going to be just like the Crusades. For two hundred years, the Arabs will continue their fight and in the end they'll do exactly what they've said. Push Israel into the sea."

Nasser will probably gain more from the Arab world in defeat than he would have gained in victory. The war made him a tragic hero around whom the emotional Arabs can rally. Soon, his new crop of generals will be making the old speeches of 1948, 1956 and 1967. His people will believe them, for fantasy is impossible to eradicate if one's whole society is structured on the perpetuation of the Arabian Nights.

Yet we must dispel that fantasy. To do so is the job to which we are all committed ... unless we are content to watch this pathetic farce of Arab self-delusion repeated in 1977, 1988 and 1999.

#### MINIMUM STANDARDS OF VESTING, FUNDING, TRANSPORTABILITY, AND REINSURANCE FOR PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York [Mr. McCARTHY] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. Speaker, many occurrences including automation, business closings, personal illness, and personal financial problems deprive many of our privately employed citizens of a pension, into which they put not only their money but also their confidence in the future.

Mr. Speaker, I believe the time has come for the Congress to aid these people.

I am, therefore, today introducing a comprehensive bill to establish minimum standards of vesting, funding, transportability, and reinsurance for pension and employee benefit plans as well as an agency which could effectively see to their execution.

My bill includes the following points:

First. Minimum vesting standards to assure broad eligibility in these plans.

Second. Minimum funding standards to assure a solvent basis to these plans, and to assure the worker that he will reap the promised benefits.

Third. Pension plan reinsurance so

that the worker will be guaranteed against termination of the plan and the accompanying loss of benefits because of cessation of the employer's business.

Fourth. A central portability fund, operating on a voluntary basis, which would greatly facilitate the transfer of benefits from one employer to another.

Fifth. Minimum ethical standards of conduct and restrictions on conflict of interest to be followed in the administration of such employee benefit plans.

Sixth. A U.S. Pension and Employee Benefit Plan Commission to administer and enforce the provisions of this bill.

Seventh. The consolidation in the Commission of most existing Federal regulatory standards relating to pension and welfare plans. Under this stipulation, a qualification certificate from the Pension Commission will be sufficient to satisfy most, if not all, Federal regulatory statutes governing employee benefit plans.

This bill was introduced in the other body by the distinguished senior Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS], and I urge strong and prompt action on this vital matter which affects so many of our citizens in private employ.

#### LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. MATHIAS of California (at the request of Mr. GERALD R. FORD), for tomorrow, on account of official business.

Mr. BUTTON (at the request of Mr. GERALD R. FORD), for today, on account of official business.

Mr. GUDE (at the request of Mr. GERALD R. FORD), for today, on account of illness.

#### SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

Mr. HALPERN (at the request of Mr. ESCH), for 10 minutes, today; and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

Mr. LAIRD (at the request of Mr. ESCH), for 20 minutes, today; and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

Mr. HALPERN (at the request of Mr. ESCH), for 5 minutes, tomorrow, October 18; and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. MATSUNAGA) to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. PEPPER, for 10 minutes, today.

Mr. McCARTHY, for 5 minutes, today.

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to extend remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD, or to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. EDMONDSON, notwithstanding the cost is estimated by the Public Printer to be \$275 to extend his remarks and include a speech by Stanley Learned.